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THE IDEA of BEAUTY,

ACCORDING TO THE

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EDINBURGH:
Printed in the year M,DCC,LVI.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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THE IDEA of BEAUTY,

According to the DOCTRINE OF PLATO.

THE Doctrine of *Plato* concerning Beauty is delivered in the *Phædrus*; a dialogue between a young man of that name, and *Socrates*: the deſign of which is to point out the true Idea of Beauty; its connection with eloquence; and to ſhow the application of it, in diſtinguiſhing between what is handſome, and not handſome, with regard to diſcourſes. There is ſomething maſterly in the conduct of this dialogue. We have firſt produced in it, a ſpeech compoſed by *Lyſias*, which is looſe and inaccurate; but ſuited to the taſte of a raw and undiſci-

plined imagination. Next we have an extempore ſpeech delivered by *Socrates*, in the name of a lover, who conceals his love. Both theſe ſpeeches agree in treating of, what *Socrates* calls, a left-handed love:——none of them is animated by the idea of Beauty. But in this they differ; that the ſecond is free from ſeveral defects in ſtyle and compoſition, which are in the firſt; and is more agreeable to the common principles of eloquence. In the third place, we have a ſpeech delivered by *Socrates* in his own perſon; which treats of love, on a plan ſuited to the chaſteſt and nobleſt ſentiments; and to ſublime and grand conceptions; and which is a ſpecimen of the influence which the true idea of Beauty hath on eloquence. The ſpeakers in this dialogue are men of very different characters; and the diſtinction is ſtrongly marked: their accidental meeting, and their manner of entering into converſation, are extremely natural: and there is a variety of circumſtances introduced, which give the dialogue the greateſt reſemblance of real life. We ſee, in *Phædrus*, a young man in high admiration of *Lyſias*, the Orator and Poet: his thoughts are full of a diſcourſe of his on love

which

which he had been hearing him recite: he imagines that *Lyſias* had ſhown great addreſs in this diſcourſe; he calls him the moſt eminent of all the writers of that age; tells that he had taken long time in compoſing it; that he could not recite it in a way worthy of him; though he wiſhed rather to be able to recite it, than to have a deal of money. He tells *Socrates*, that the deſign of it is to prove, that it is more proper to beſtow favours on one who is not a lover, than on one who is. It would have been complaiſant, ſays *Socrates*, had he alſo wrote, that it is more proper to beſtow favours on the poor, than on the rich; on the old, than on the young; with whatever elſe is ſuited to my condition. We ſee the humour of *Socrates*, in ridiculing *Phædrus* for the difficulty he made of reciting a diſcourſe, which, at the ſame time, he had the ſtrongeſt inclination to recite. On this, *Phædrus* conſents to give the chief points of it; but pretends he had not thoroughly learned the very words: but *Socrates* obſerving, that he had ſomething in his left hand under his robe, which he conjectured was the ſpeech itſelf, *Phædrus* owns, he was now diſappointed of his deſign of exerciſing before

Socrates

Socrates his own genius, and agrees to produce the ſpeech; and with intention to find a proper place to ſit down, and read it, they agree to go along the *Ilyſſus*, and *Phædrus* propoſes to conduct *Socrates* to the ſhade of a plain-tree, now in view. *Phædrus* was then without ſhoes, as *Socrates* was always; and it is obſerved, what pleaſure it would give at that ſeaſon of the year, and at that time of the day, to walk with their feet wet in the water; to enjoy the ſhade, and a moderate breeze; to ſit down, or lie on the ſoft graſs. Various circumſtances are deſcribed to fix the imagination, and engage the attention. Such as the connection of the place with the ancient tradition reſpecting *Boreas* and *Orithya*; the cool and tranſparent water; its being the haunt of girls for ſporting in the water; the temple of *Diana*; the altar of *Boreas*; *Phædrus*'s queſtion to *Socrates* about the meaning of that tradition; his interpretation of it; his regard for the Delphic inſcription; and his ſtriking manner of applying it. The beautiful deſcription of this retirement has an agreeable effect on the mind, as it preſents in a manner to our view, a plain-tree very ſpreading and lofty; a willow

low extremely beautiful, and in the prime of its bloſſom, rendering the place moſt fragrant; a moſt delightful fountain below; with little images and ſtatues, conſecrated to the Nymphs and *Achelous*. The circumſtance of the fine air of the place is alſo mentioned, with ſomething vernal and delightful, echoing to the chorus of the graſshoppers. To this delightful place, *Phædrus* conducts *Socrates*, of whom he obſerves; that he reſembles ſome ſtranger, and not a native of the country, in that he never travelled out of the city, into its territories; and hardly ever went beyond the city-wall. To which *Socrates* replies, with his uſual good humour; that he was a lover of learning; that the fields could not teach him any thing; but the men in the city could: but that *Phædrus* ſeemed now to have found a charm to make him go out of the city; for that in the ſame manner as they lead hungry cattle after them; by preſenting to them graſs or grain; ſo he, in holding out to him diſcourſes in a book, ſeemed able to lead him through all *Attica*, or where-ever elſe he inclined. Being now come to the place which *Phædrus* had propoſed; where there was a gentle

acclivity

acclivity, covered with graſs, to lean one's head on, when lying along; *Socrates* thought fit to lye down, and deſires *Phædrus* to chuſe any poſture he thinks beſt for reading; and accordingly he begins to read the ſpeech of *Lyſias*. This ſpeech is a ridiculous piece of compoſition, remarkable for puerile antitheſes, and the continual chiming of its words: and it is a curious ſpecimen of that finical ſort of ſtyle, which is admired by young men of no taſte, as elegance of expreſſion. As to lovers, he ſays, they themſelves acknowledge, that they are rather mad, than wiſe; that they know, that they are not right in their judgment; that they are not able to govern themſelves; ſo that how can they who are found in their judgment, deem theſe things to be right, which thoſe others affect and incline? *Phædrus* however beſtows high commendations on this diſcourſe; imagines it is wonderful in other reſpects, and particularly for the expreſſions; and is diſpleaſed with *Socrates* for laughing at it; who ſays it was truly marvellous; and ridicules *Phædrus* for the delight he ſeemed to have in reading it. *Phædrus* however having in a ſolemn manner given it as his opinion, that none of the

Greeks

Greeks could ſay better things, or in greater number about the ſame matter: *Socrates* makes ſome remarks on the ſpeech, and alledges, that the chief care of *Lyſias* in it ſeems to have been about his expreſſions; to poliſh them, to make them plain, round, and accurate; that he makes frequent repetitions of the ſame things; that he ſhows a juvenile turn, in affecting to be able to ſay the ſame thing two different ways; and that he has not ſaid ſo much on his ſubject, as one may do who has but dipt into the ancients, and has not read them with a deſign of improving himſelf in eloquence. In this ſpeech, it muſt be owned, there is a ſort of harmony; but of what kind? there is no correſpondence of parts to any idea of what is real and permanent; but ſuch only as to make the expreſſions clink, and to create a gingle of words. *Phædrus* however is provoked at *Socrates* for his free remarks; challenges him to ſay better things himſelf; no fewer, and wholly different from thoſe ſaid by *Lyſias*; and promiſes, in that caſe, to erect at *Delphos*, a golden ſtatue, equal not only to his own weight, but alſo to that of *Socrates*. To which *Socrates* makes a reply which amounts

to

to this; that a man is not to be commended as an orator, becauſe another cannot ſay things entirely different from him; for the naughtieſt writer is not thus to be defeated; and that as in thoſe things which are common and obvious, it is the arangement of them chiefly which deſerves commendation; ſo with regard to things not neceſſary, and difficult to find out; not only is the arangement to be commended, but likewiſe the invention. *Phædrus* admits theſe principles, yet ſtill inſiſts with *Socrates* for his ſpeech, and at length prevails with him. As the deſign of *Socrates*, in this ſpeech, is to ridicule *Lyſias*; he undertakes to deliver one offhand, to ſtand in competition with his; and making an invocation of the muſes, wraps himſelf up, on pretence that he may in the ſpeedieſt manner run thro' his diſcourſe, and not be diſconcerted by ſhame in looking at *Phædrus*; which is a contraſt to the impudence of *Lyſias*: and to unfold his character ſtill further, he delivers his ſpeech in the name of a lover, who conceals his love, and diſcourſes of the bad effects of love to the party beloved: and in a ſpeech founded on the ſame idea of love, with that of *Lyſias*, he

defeats him, in accuracy, in method and order, in variety, in ſimplicity, and poetical harmony of expreſſion. Firſt, he propoſes to ſettle the definition of love; what it is, and what power it hath; that having regard to this, it may be diſcovered whether it affords advantage, or detriment. He obſerves, that love is a certain deſire; that deſire is not that which diſtinguiſhes its character; that there are two leading principles in us, the deſire of pleaſure, and opinion aiming at what is beſt; that ſometimes the one prevails, and ſometimes the other. That ſtate in which reaſon prevails, is called *temperance*, and when deſire draws unreaſonably to pleaſures, and hath the empire in us, this is denominated *licentiouſneſs*: that licentiouſneſs is multiform; for the deſire which reſpects eating, when it prevails over reaſon, is called *gluttony*; when it tyrannizes with regard to drunkenneſs, it is evident what appellation it ſhall get. And as to all the other appellations a-kin to theſe, and belonging to the deſires a-kin, each hath its denomination from what is prevalent. The deſire which is without reaſon, and controuls opinion tending to what is beſt, being led towards the pleaſure

of beauty, and this inclination being powerfully ſtrengthened by its kindred deſires, and becoming ſuperior, receives its appellation from this ſtrength, and hath been called *love*. Having thus defined love with a flow of language beyond his uſual, he next proceeds to deſcribe the effects of it: and firſt takes notice, that, as the lover will always endeavour to render the party beloved as pleaſant to himſelf as poſſible; and as to one diſeaſed every thing is pleaſant which doth not give controul; he, therefore, endeavours to render the party beloved inferior and indigent: and as the ignorant, is inferior to the wiſe; the timorous, to the brave; the man unable to ſpeak, to the orator; the lover muſt be delighted with ſuch evils in the party beloved, if naturally inherent; and if otherwiſe, he muſt endeavour to impart them. On the ſame principle, he keeps him back from many profitable acquaintance; and, what is the greateſt detriment, takes care to keep far from him divine philoſophy; afraid of being deſpiſed himſelf: ſo that the man in love is by no means a profitable guardian with reference to the mind. *Socrates* next conſiders the effects of love with reference to the body:

body: and obſerves, that the lover will ſeek after ſome effeminate body, and not a durable one; a body adorned with foreign ornaments and colours: then, conſidering the effects of love with regard to poſſeſſions, he obſerves; that the lover, of all things, deſires moſt, that the party beloved be deſtitute of the deareſt, the moſt affectionate, and moſt divine poſſeſſions; and chuſes to ſtrip his partner of father, and mother, and kindred, and friends, when he deems them hinderers of his pleaſures. And as a perſon poor in circumſtances is more eaſily gained and more eaſily held, the lover would deſire the party beloved to be deſtitute of ſubſtance. There are other evils beſides, ſays he, ariſing from love; but ſome dæmon hath mixed with the moſt of them a momentary pleaſure; in the ſame way as in the flatterer, that dreadful monſter, and great detriment, nature hath mingled a certain pleaſure, not inelegant; and one may likewiſe deſpiſe a ſtrumpet, as a moſt hurtful thing; and animals of this kind, which however are every day counted moſt pleaſant: but the lover is not only hurtful to the party beloved, but the moſt unpleaſant. *Socrates*, taking it for granted that a perſon

under

under the empire of love will chuſe for his partner one conſiderably younger than himſelf, obſerves; that every thing of neceſſity is ſaid to be grievous in every caſe, and to every one; and this, ſays he, the lover brings on his partner, in a ſtrong degree: for beſides his diſſimilarity, which muſt cauſe diſguſt; when one advanced in years is united to one younger, there is no reſpite, neither day nor night, from his deſire of pleaſure; but, in ſeeing, hearing, touching, feeling, and every other ſenſation, he wants the party beloved to miniſter to it. Now, ſays he, what kind of conſolation, or what ſort of pleaſure can the party beloved receive from him, ſo as not to feel, when in his company, the utmoſt diſguſt, in viewing his elderly countenance; with other things in connexion with this, which are unpleaſant to hear of in a diſcourſe, and much more ſo to be neceſſitated to have to do with in fact; being guarded always, and in every ſhape by ſuſpicious guards; hearing unſeaſonable and exceſſive praiſes, and in the ſame manner defamations, accompanied with diſguſting and exceſſive impudence in the expreſſion. Thus, whilſt in love, he is pernicious and unpleaſant;

unpleaſant; and when his love is over, he is ever after void of faith to the party beloved, to whom he promiſed many things; and with many oaths and entreaties, hardly prevailed on his partner to endure his company, which then was burdenſome: and when he ought to make payment, having got another governor and overſeer within himſelf, intelligence and temperance in place of love and madneſs, and being quite a different man, he forgets the party beloved, who now requires from him the return of favours; putting him in mind of what was done and ſaid, as if he were ſtill the ſame perſon: but he, thro' ſhame, neither dares to tell that he is altered, nor to accompliſh the vows and promiſes made under the former fooliſh government: hence, he, who formerly was a lover, now of neceſſity withdraws his love; becomes a fugitive; and, his ſhell being broken, he flies away: and the other is neceſſitated to purſue after him, with indignation and imprecation; ignorant that one ought never to gratify a lover, and one neceſſarily unintelligent; but much rather one who is not a lover, and is intelligent. The concluſion of the ſpeech is, that the friendſhip

friendſhip of a lover is not accompanied with kindneſs; but, like the deſire of food, is for the ſake of a fill;

As wolves love lambs.——

Socrates, after obviating a remark made by *Phædrus* on the defects of his diſcourſe, wants to croſs the river, before he is engaged in any thing further: but his dæmon prevents him; that ſign which was wont to happen to him, and to reſtrain him in ſome things he was going to do: he heard a voice, which did not ſuffer him to go away, till he ſhould perform ſome expiation; as one who had ſome how offended againſt the deity: and in conſequence of that prophetic power which he ſuppoſes in the mind, he thinks, he now perceives the fault, which occaſioned ſome diſturbance a while ago, when he was delivering his ſpeech. Dreadful! *Phædrus!* dreadful! ſays he, is the ſpeech you have advanced yourſelf; and have likeways compelled me to make. The uſe of the word, love, in ſuch a ſenſe, as reproaches human nature, is the fault with which he charges both the diſcourſes; for this fault,

fault, he thinks he muſt of neceſſity, make expiation; and is reſolved to be wiſer in this matter than thoſe who repent after they ſuffer puniſhment; for, before he ſuffers any thing, he is to make a recantation, with his head bare, and not covered, as before, thro' ſhame. He charges both diſcourſes with impudence; this, which he delivered himſelf; and that of *Lyſias*, read from the book. So neceſſary, according to *Plato*, are refined ſentiments, and ſublime ideas, to elegance of diſcourſe, and true politeneſs; and ſo ſtrongly doth the uſe of words, in a mean and low ſenſe, which expreſs the affections, diſcover, according to him, rough and unpoliſhed manners. If any one of a generous diſpoſition, ſays he, were happening to hear men ſay; that lovers, for ſmall matters, take up mighty hatreds; behave towards the parties beloved, enviouſly, and hurtfully; he would reckon he was hearing people who had been bred amongſt tars, and ſuch as had never ſeen any love of a liberal kind. *Socrates*, therefore, out of reverence for one of a polite and generous diſpoſition; and being afraid of love himſelf; propoſes to dilute, by a liquid diſcourſe, the ſaltneſs in the

the ear; to take off the impreſſion made by the former diſcourſes, which are ſpecimens of that falſe eloquence which hath not a chaſte foundation: and gives it as his opinion, that *Lyſias* be adviſed, as ſoon as poſſible, to vary his ſtyle; and to write, that it is fit, in like circumſtances, to gratify the lover, rather than the perſon not in love. After the repreſentation of ſeveral circumſtances, which give the dialogue the air of real life; *Socrates* proceeds to give a ſpecimen of a diſcourſe, founded upon a nobler principle than that of the former; the tendency of it is to raiſe the mind to the true Idea of Beauty; and at the ſame time to ſhow how much language is animated by that Idea, and how eſſential it is to the power of eloquence. The ſubject of this diſcourſe, as well as of the former, is love; but love in a higher ſenſe; in a ſenſe more ſuited to a generous and refined diſpoſition; and ſuch influence hath idea on language, and on the light in which matters are viewed by the mind, that *Socrates*, riſing above the ſyſtem of the two former diſcourſes, undertakes to prove what ſeems to overthrow that ſyſtem; by ſhowing that the propoſition is not true

which

which alledges; that, in the preſence of a lover, the perſon not in love ought rather to be gratified; for this reaſon, that the one is mad, or enthuſiaſtic; and the other, wiſe and not excited. For, according to him, if enthuſiaſm, ſimply conſidered, were an evil, it had been juſtly ſaid; but now, ſays he, the greateſt goods ariſe to us from enthuſiaſm, given us by divine inſpiration. For the Propheteſs at *Delphos*, and the Prieſteſs at *Dodona*, have, in their enthuſiaſm, done many and excellent things to *Greece*, both public and private; but, when not excited, have done little or nothing: and if we ſhould mention the *Sybill* likeways, and all others, who making uſe of divine enthuſiaſm, have truly foretold to many perſons, many things which were to happen; it would be mentioning what is evident to every one: and this alſo may be alledged, that theſe ancients who ſettled the names of things, did not reckon enthuſiaſm baſe, or diſgraceful; otherways they would not have expreſſed, by that word, that nobleſt art by which futurity is diſcerned. And, after taking notice of the revolution which theſe words have undergone, which denote divination, augu-

ry, and the ſearch into futurity by other ſigns, he obſerves; as far as divination is ſuperior to augury, and the name of the one, to the name of the other; and the effect of the one, to that of the other; ſo far the ancients atteſt enthuſiaſm to be more excellent than prudence; the enthuſiaſm which proceedeth from God, than the prudence which is with men. He further obſerves, that when the greateſt diſtempers, and ſufferings, have, through the anger of God, been among any people for their crimes, enthuſiaſm, ariſing, and propheſying, hath found out a remedy, enjoining invocations, and religious ſervices, and, diſcovering expiations, and propitiations, hath brought about a deliverance from preſent and future evils. He mentions a third ſpecies of enthuſiaſm, which is that by the Muſes: where this, ſaith he, ſeizes a gentle, and unbroken ſoul, it rouſeth it, and maketh it to celebrate in the ſublimeſt manner, in odes, and other poetry, a thouſand exploits of the ancients; and in celebrating them, gives inſtruction to poſterity. But, whoever, without this enthuſiaſm, comes to the poetic gates of the Muſes, perſuaded

that

that he may be a poet ſufficiently by art, ſhall be imperfect himſelf; and the poetry of this prudent man, ſhall diſappear before that of the men who are excited by enthuſiaſm. So many, now, are the fine actions, and I can mention more, of enthuſiaſm, ſays he, when it proceedeth from the Gods: ſo that we are not to be afraid of this; nor let any ſpeech give us diſturbance, while it alledges, that preferably to the excited, we ought to make choice of the prudent friends: but, in order to gain the prize, let it ſhow; that love, ſent by the Gods to the lover, is not for the advantage of the lover himſelf, and the party beloved: he adds, that he is to ſhow, the reverſe to be true; and that the proof of it, though it will be incredible to the dull, will be credible to the wiſe.

As it is neceſſary, in order to determine the character of love, conſidered as a ſpecies of inſpiration, to know ourſelves; to know what ſoul is; whether there be a ſubſtance diſtinct from body; what is ſupreme and moſt perfect in that ſubſtance; what are the relations of the human ſoul to that which is ſupreme and divine; what was its original ſtate; what attainments it is capable of;

its

its duration; and the different periods of its exiſtence; what orders of intermediate beings there are between it, and the ſupreme; and the dependence of all the different orders on one common head; its diſtinction from the brutal kind; and the characters of that divine government to which the whole ſyſtem is ſubjected; the faculties and affections, the actions and ſufferings which belong to the ſoul; its connection with a ſpecies of beauty, diſtinct from that which is relative to ſenſe:—— All theſe things are unfolded in this ſpeech of *Socrates*: and if we throw off our dullneſs, we will ſee this done in ſuch a way as to point out the true idea of this beauty; the reality and good effects of that love which is an affection correſpondent to it; and which *Socrates* conſiders as a ſpecies of inſpiration, ariſing from the influence of that idea of beauty which gives power and energy to eloquence.

What *Socrates* hath immediately in view in this ſpeech is, to diſcover the truth with regard to ſoul, both the divine and human: the beginning of his proof ſhows, that ſoul is a ſubſtance diſtinct from body, more real

and

and more durable; by obſerving, that ſoul is that which is the principle of motion, the principle of life; that which animates body, and which moveth itſelf; that it is ſelf-exiſtent; the author of the heavens; that by which they are upheld in their operations; and the cauſe of all things generated. Theſe characters, no doubt, give us the idea of the Divine Being; but when we have this idea, the immortality of the human ſoul becomes highly credible to us; as it diſſipates the chief difficulty, which incumbers the belief of it, that of conceiving a ſubſtance diſtinct from body; giving us the conception of a ſubſtance which is ſo independent on body, as to be the author of all its motions: and, what illuſtrates this credibility, is, that the ſubſtance diſtinct from body, which is called ſoul, includes both what is divine and human: ſuch is the alliance between the Divine Being and the human ſoul: and, as *Socrates* obſerves afterwards, it is a general principle, that ſoul taketh care of body; and that, of all things which belong to body, the ſoul is that which partaketh moſt of the divine nature. As for the character of the ſoul; of what kind it is, in this preſent ſtate;

Socrates

Socrates pretends only to declare what it reſembleth; and he compares the ſoul to the combined power of a winged chariot and charioteer; and gives hints of a prior ſtate of integrity, under this image, that our ruler, at firſt, governed the reins of the chariot; but that afterwards one of the horſes only was good and handſome, and the other was the reverſe; ſo that the work of the charioteer with regard to us, is truly difficult and troubleſome. He obſerves, that man is a kind of immortal creature, having a ſoul, and having alſo a body; he hath the denomination of mortal, and is alſo immortal, but not in the higheſt ſenſe of the expreſſion; having never ſufficiently ſeen nor known God. The tendency of his nobleſt powers is repreſented under the image of wings, which raiſe the ſoul upwards to the region of immortal being, and of ſuperior intelligences. As the tendency of its ſublimeſt powers is to riſe to what is divine; and the divine is beautiful, wiſe, and good, and every thing of this kind; by theſe things, the winged part of the ſoul, is principally nouriſhed, and increaſed; but by what is ugly, and ill, and ſuch oppoſites, it is corrupted,

rupted, and loſt. He ſhows, that in thoſe upper regions to which the winged ſoul is endeavouring to riſe, there are different orders of intelligent being; which have different provinces and diſtricts aſſigned them; he deſcribes the regularity of their conduct; the facility with which they proceed in a regular courſe; and their juſtice in minding each their own affairs: he ſuggeſts, that they preſent an example worthy of imitation to inferior ſouls; that they afford many bleſſed viſions and appearances; that envy is wholly excluded from this aſſembly; and that, when they hold a feaſt or banquet, they aſcend upwards to the higheſt heavenly ſummit; and their chariots being equally poiſed and well-reined, go eaſily; but the others go with difficulty: for the horſe, ſays he, which partaketh of evil, weighs down, tending to earth, where the good horſe is not nouriſhed by the charioteer; and hence ariſe the greateſt labour and ſtruggle to the ſoul: but theſe who are called immortals, behold the things beyond the heavens; a region, which none of the poets hath as yet celebrated, nor ever will they celebrate it as it deſerves. *Socrates* takes notice, that it is after this manner,

ner, the Eſſence, which is void of colour, and of figure, which is intangible, and truly exiſtent, uſeth intuitive intelligence alone, as the Governor of the ſoul: and contemplating for a time the being of every ſoul, which is to receive what is fitting for it, is pleaſed; and in beholding truth, is nouriſhed, and enabled for its proper work and buſineſs; till it return in its regular courſe to this place again, for new ſupplies, where it beholdeth juſtice itſelf, it beholdeth prudence, it beholdeth knowledge, not that to which generation is annexed, but that which is exiſtent in real being. And they appear to have this contemplation, and correſpondent action alternately. This is the life of ſuperior beings: as to other ſouls, they are of different characters. That which in the beſt manner followeth the ſuperior beings, and reſembleth them, raiſeth the head of the charioteer to the upper region; but, being diſturbed by the horſes, with difficulty perceiveth real beings. Another ſometimes riſeth up; at other times goeth down; and the horſes being unruly, it ſeeth ſome things, but not others. There are others, who being deſirous of things above, follow them;

them; but being unable to reach them, they are whirled about, gnaſhing their teeth, trampling on one another, the one endeavouring to be before the other; ſo that there is tumult, and contention, and the greateſt ſtruggle. By the badneſs of the charioteers, many are lamed; many have their wings much damaged; and all of them, after having a great deal of toil, go away diſappointed of the ſight of real being; and when they go away, they uſe the food of opinion: but that nouriſhment which is fitting for what is beſt in the ſoul, happens to be from the meadow of truth, which is difficult to perceive; and the nature of the wing by which the ſoul riſes is only nouriſhed by it. This is a divine decree, That every ſoul, which, being a companion of God, perceiveth any thing of reality, ſhall be unhurt till the next period; and if it be able to do this always, it ſhall always be unhurt: but when, being unable to follow, it doth not perceive reality; and, falling into ſome misfortune, becomes full of forgetfulneſs and vice; it is weighed down, its wings fall away, and it falls to the earth. Which account of matters, diſtinguiſhes the character of true virtue; the

character of true knowledge; and what is their only ſecurity againſt all hurt and miſery. And, in what follows, we have the ſentiments of *Socrates* concerning the characters of the divine government; its diſtributive juſtice; its clemency; its wiſdom; its equity; the extent and univerſality of its laws of juſtice; its beauty and impartiality; the permanency of its laws with reſpect to the diſtinction and arangement of the different orders and ſpecies of being: the ſentiments of *Socrates* on theſe matters are repreſented in ſuch a ſtile, and under ſuch images as to be diſcernible by the wiſe; but can never be perceived by dunces in philoſophy. After this account of the divine government, he marks out the chief diſtinction of man from inferior beings; and the diſtinction conſiſts in this; that he riſes from the perceptions of ſenſe to one general idea; uniting in one idea the various qualities relative to theſe perceptions: but *Socrates* is ſo far from ſuppoſing ideas of this kind generated by ſenſible objects, that he refers them to a præexiſtent ſtate, in which the ſoul was with God, and ſaw reality. He makes the remembrance of what was ſeen in that ſtate,

the thing which diſtinguiſheth the philoſopher, and renders him ſuperior to others: for that, to the philoſopher, ſenſible objects are memorials of what is intellectual; and from thence he takes occaſion to raiſe his mind to what is divine; and thus performing the ſacred myſteries always in a perfect manner; and ſtanding aloof from the purſuits of mankind; and applying himſelf to what is divine, he is reproached by the generality; and whilſt he is filled with inſpiration, the generality do not obſerve it. And as to the whole that has been ſaid about the fourth ſpecies of enthuſiaſm, *Socrates* obſerves it amounts to this: that when the philoſopher perceiveth beauty here, he remembereth the true beauty; in conſequence of which his ſoul fluttereth; and, in fluttering, endeavours to fly up; but being unable, looking upwards like a bird, and neglecting the things below, he is accuſed as affected with madneſs: and of all enthuſiaſms, this, he ſays, is the beſt; and ariſes from the beſt things: and it is on this account that the philoſopher is called a lover: but to have ſufficient remembrance, is the attainment of ut a few; for to recollect from the things

here,

here, thoſe things that are there, is not eaſy for every one; nor for ſuch as have perceived the things there, but for a ſhort while; or, who, in falling down, have been misfortunate; or, who, thro' certain aſſociations, have been turned to injuſtice, and forget the ſacred rites they perceived above. And even thoſe few, who perceive in things here any reſemblance of the things above, are ſtruck with admiration; and are ignorant what this affection is, as they do not perceive things thoroughly. For there is no ſplendor in thoſe reſemblances, which are here, of moral characters; of juſtice, and prudence, and ſuch other things as are valuable to ſouls; ſo that there are but few, who with difficulty, and by means of dull organs, applying to the images, perceive the genus of what is repreſented by theſe images. Even by our ſight, ſays he, which is the quickeſt of all our ſenſes, wiſdom is not perceived; but it would excite wonderful loves, if it afforded a powerful image of itſelf, entering our ſight like other amiable objects; but beauty alone hath this property, that it is the moſt reſplendent, and the moſt amiable. Reſplendent beauty was then

to be ſeen, when with a bleſſed aſſembly, we ſaw and performed the moſt perfect of the ſacred myſteries; which we ſacredly performed, being ourſelves in our integrity, and unaffected with thoſe evils, which awaited us in after-times: and being initiated in pure and ſimple, and invariable, and happy viſions; and contemplating them in a pure light, being pure ourſelves; and unſtained with this we carry about with us, called *body*, binding us round in the manner of a ſhell. With relation to beauty, he ſays, it ſhone bright there along with other bleſſed viſions: ſince we have come hither, we have apprehended it by the moſt vigorous of our ſenſes, ſhining in the moſt vigorous manner; which is not our caſe with reſpect to moral characters. He next ſhows, how much depends on having the remembrance of beauty: the man who doth not attain to it, is overcome of pleaſure; but he who takes occaſion from external beauty, to recollect the incorporeal idea, is affected in a different manner: when one, ſays he, who is newly abſolved, views a face which hath a divine reſemblance, which imitateth beauty handſomely; or ſome incorporeal idea;

he

he hath a dread; horrors ſeize him; and upon attending to it, he feels diſpoſitions to worſhip it as a God. Then we have a deſcription of the impreſſions, which a glimpſe of this intellectual beauty makes upon the the ſoul; its ferments; its inward ſtruggles; its vexing pain, and uneaſineſs; its reſpite from pain; its joys; when, on ſome portion of beauty flowing into it, it gives ſcope to correſponding deſires; the diſorder it hath, whilſt theſe deſires are pent up; the relief it feels in conſequence of their being looſed by remembrance of the beautiful; its delicious pleaſure on being thus refreſhed; its attachment to beauty, ſo as to forget mothers, brothers, and all others; and when its poſſeſſions are loſt, to count it as nothing. And he adds, that in worſhipping him who poſſeſſes beauty, it findeth the moſt effectual medicine of the greateſt pains.

He admits, however, of a diverſity of character among thoſe who attain to the remembrance of the beautiful; anſwering to that diverſity which was among them, in their pre-exiſtent ſtate; and to what, in the government of nature, chiefly engages their attention, and is moſt correſpondent to their

reſpective

reſpective diſpoſitions. That form of beauty which appears moſt reſplendent to each ſeverally, among the different orders of intelligence concerned in the government of the world, he ſets before himſelf, as the model of his virtue; and in conformity to this, endeavours to faſhion his own manners, and the manners of his friends. They have no envy, nor illiberal malevolence towards their friends; but endeavour as much as poſſible to bring them to the utmoſt conformity to themſelves, and to the God they honour. This is the earneſt endeavour of thoſe who truly love; and this the end they reach, if they reach what they endeavour after. By which it appears, how much friendſhip, on the principles of *Plato*, ennobles the mind, and adorns the human life. *Socrates* concludes his ſpeech with a recapitulation of what he had ſaid; and it amounts to this. The ſoul may be divided into three; repreſented under the images of a charioteer, and two horſes; one of the horſes, good; and the other, vicious; the good one, beautiful; being lofty in his look; regular in his ſhape; carrying his neck high; hawk-noſed; ſhining in his appearance; black-eyed; a lover

of

of honour, with temperance and modeſty; the companion of true opinion; not needing the laſh; but managed by admonition, and reaſon. The other, again; ill-ſhaped; froward; hurrying at random; ſtiff-necked; bearing his neck low; of the face of an ape; duſky-coloured; with eyes blue, and blood-ſhot; with ears, thick with hair; deaf to admonition; the companion of inſolence, and arrogance; and, with difficulty, yielding to the whip and ſpur. That, great is the difficulty of ſubduing this vicious horſe; that it is a work of toil and labour; and that the utmoſt addreſs and prudence are neceſſary for this purpoſe: and that the good effects of attaining to this conqueſt, reſpect not only a preſent life, but alſo the life which is to come. That true friendſhip is a divine thing; for that it hath never been decreed, that evil ſhall be a friend to evil; nor that good ſhall not be a friend to good; nor is it to be feared that it is the law, that theſe ſhould go into darkneſs, who have begun the heavenly journey. But that the familiarity of one who is not a lover, is connected with mortal temperance; and diſpenſing what is mortal and nigardly, begetteth in the ſoul

beloved, ſordidneſs; which, tho' it may be commended as a virtue by the vulgar, is of fatal influence; and makes the ſoul poſſeſſed of it, wander under the earth, void of intelligence, nine million of years. To this he adds the following exclamation. This recantation, friend Love, is preſented to you, as the nobleſt, and the beſt, in our power; which *Phædrus* hath neceſſitated me to expreſs in poetical words. Granting, then, forgiveneſs, of what I ſaid formerly; and accepting favourably what I ſay now; be propitious, and merciful; and neither take from me that art of love thou haſt vouchſafed, nor in anger impair it; but grant me to be ſtill more than at preſent in honour among the beautiful; and if, in what hath now been mentioned, *Phædrus* and I have ſaid any thing diſpleaſing, blame *Lyſias* the father of this diſcourſe; and making him give over ſuch diſcourſes as this he now hath uttered turn him to philoſophy, as his brother *Polemarchas* hath been turned; that ſo his lover here may no longer be divided in his purſuits as at preſent; but regulate his life uniformly, according to love, with philoſophic eloquence.

Socrates having pointed out the true idea of beauty, and its influence on virtue; in a diſcourſe, which is itſelf an example of its influence on eloquence, proceeds now to apply this idea; and unfolds a ſet of principles on which we may diſtinguiſh between ſpeaking and writing handſomely, and the contrary. Before he enters on this head, he takes notice of the advantageous circumſtances they were in, for making ſuch a diſquiſition: we are at leiſure, ſays he, and at the ſame time the graſshoppers ſeem to be ſinging over our heads, as in the heat; and diſcourſing with one another, they likewiſe obſerve us: if, now, they ſhall perceive us two, like the generality, not diſcourſing at noon, but ſleeping, and lulled by them, through ſluggiſhneſs of underſtanding, they may juſtly ridicule us; imagining that certain ſlaves are come to them, into this retreat, like ſheep, paſſing the noon by a fountain: but if they perceive us diſcourſing together, and ſailing by them, as by the *Syrens*, unlulled, they may, readily, being delighted with us, give us the reward which they have from the Gods to give to men. After this curious preamble, *Socrates* obſerves,

obſerves; that, truth of ſentiment, and the knowledge of what really is, are eſſential to eloquence; that without theſe a ſpeaker would be ridiculous, like one who beſtows theſe praiſes on an aſs, which belong to an horſe; or, which is worſe ſtill, he would be hoſtile; when, regarding the opinions of the generality, who are ignorant of good and evil, he ſhould perſuade them to do ill, in place of what is good: when the ſpeech is about ſuch ſubjects as are denoted by the words, iron, and ſilver, there is hardly room for deception: but till one ſufficiently philoſophizes, he ſhall never be a ſufficient ſpeaker, when the ſubjects relate to good or evil.—That the man, therefore, who is to poſſeſs the rhetorical art, muſt have knowledge to ſeparate, and diſtinguiſh things in order; and apprehend a certain character of each ſpecies, ſeverally; in what the generality muſt neceſſarily err; and in what they cannot be deceived. He ſhows, that every diſcourſe is to be conſtituted like an animal; having a certain body of its own: ſo as neither to be without a head, nor feet; but have middle and extremity, in fitneſs to one another, and to the whole: that the orator muſt be able to draw into one

idea,

idea, in one view, what things are ſcattered many ways; that defining each particular thing, he may make it evident, what it is he deſires to inſtruct in.

And, that he be able to divide again into particulars, according to the natural diviſions; and not attempt to break any part, in the manner of a naughty cook.

He expoſes the vulgar rules of eloquence, relating to the common diviſions of diſcourſe into proemium, narrative, proofs, conjectures, reſemblances, confirmations, and further confirmations.

He ridicules the different arts which the reputed orators piqued themſelves on, and the ſuppoſed improvements they imagined they had made in ſtyle and compoſition. Such as, the confutations, and the reconfutations; the preferring the probable, to the true; the art of being able to make the little appear great, and great appear little; new things appear old, and the reverſe appear new; the inventions of a compendious manner of diſcourſe; as alſo of an infinite prolixity; the mighty diſcovery, that diſcourſes ought neither to be long, nor ſhort, but moderate; the invention of the muſical parts of diſcourſe;

and

and the reduplication of expreſſions; the language of the paſſions; with whatever elſe is commonly ſuppoſed to be comprehended in the art of diſcourſe.

Having treated theſe things in the way of humour, as inconſiderable, he ſhows in what the power of the art depends: and obſerves, that it is in this, as in other things; if you have naturally a rhetorical genius, you ſhall become an eminent rhetorician, when you add to it, knowledge and ſtudy; which he illuſtrates by the inſtance of *Pericles*, who attended on the inſtructions of *Anaxagoras* concerning nature, and its dependance on mind; and who added to his natural good genius, that ſtudy and contemplation of nature, which are neceſſary to elevate the conceptions of the ſoul.

He conſiders virtue as the end of rhetoric. The manner of the rhetorical art, ſays he, is the ſame as that of the medicinal; in both of them, nature muſt be diſſected; in the one, the nature of the body; and in the other, the nature of the mind; if you extend, not only by practice and experience, but by applying druggs and food to the one,

according

according to art, to produce in it health and ſtrength; and by applying to the other diſcourſes and legal inſtitutions, to impart to it the perſuaſion you deſire, and virtue.

He lays it down as a principle, that to apprehend the nature of the ſoul, in any degree worth mentioning, it is proper to underſtand the nature of the whole. That we ought to apprehend, in the firſt place, whether it is ſimple or multiform; and next, if it be ſimple, to conſider its power; what power it naturally hath for any thing in the way of acting; or what power it hath in ſuffering: and if it be multiform, to make an enumeration of theſe ſpecies; and to conſider with regard to each of theſe ſeverally, what it is naturally able to do, or what it can ſuffer by any thing. The method of eloquence, without theſe things, he ſays, reſembleth the walk of a blind man; but no one who partaketh of art ought to reſemble one blind, or deaf. That ſince the power of diſcourſe is that of leading the ſoul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician, muſt neceſſarily know how many ſpecies the ſoul hath; whence ſome are of ſuch characters; and others are of other. So great a lover was he of the

Dialectic

Dialectic art; and of ſuch conſequence did he reckon that art to enable one to diſcourſe and underſtand; that he declares, that if he knew any one capable to diſcern, the *one* and the *many*, according as they are in nature; him he would follow, tracing his footſteps as if he were a god.

When one knows the above-mentioned principles; knows what exiſts in actions; knows that ſuch a particular man is in ſuch a particular manner to be addreſſed; and likeways the ſeaſon when to ſpeak and when to be ſilent; and underſtandeth what is proper with regard to the ſhortneſs of diſcourſe; and what tends to move compaſſion and indignation; and alſo the proper and improper ſeaſons of theſe; then is the art of rhetoric compleatly executed; and not till then.

The opinion which the orators in *Plato*'s time had, of the principles he has laid down with regard to eloquence, appears from the account which he gives of it. Which is, That theſe matters ought noways to be ſo dignified; nor the diſquiſition of them to be made in ſo long a compaſs; and that the man who wants to be ſufficiently rhetorical, needs not participate of truth, with reference to juſt

and

and good actions. For that every where, in courts of judicature, no one minded, in theſe matters, any thing of truth; but only what tended to perſuade; and that is, what is probable: and this he ought to attend to, who deſigns to ſpeak with art; and that ſometimes, facts themſelves are not to be mentioned: but that the probable only is to be ſpoke, both in accuſation and defence: that the ſpeaker ought by all means to purſue probability; wholly quitting the truth: and that where this prevails in every diſcourſe, the whole art is ſhown. This piece of wiſdom and artifice, ſays *Plato*, in the name of *Socrates*, is probably diſcovered with a view to ſhow, that if any one weak and courageous ſhould beat a ſtrong and cowardly man, and take from him his clock, or any thing elſe; and be brought before a court of judicature, neither of them ought to tell the truth; the cowardly one, not to tell that he was beat by the courageous man alone; the other to ſhow they were alone; and to make uſe of this defence; How ſhould I, being ſuch as I am, make an attack on ſuch as he is? The one to conceal his courage; and the other not to tell his daſtardlineſs. Thus we

ſee what were the principles of the reputed orators in *Plato*'s time: but the great principle of *Plato*'s eloquence is this: Unleſs, ſays he, one ſhall eſtimate the natural tempers of his hearers, and be able to divide things into their ſpecies, and comprehend the ſeveral particulars in one idea, he ſhall never be truly artful in diſcourſes, as far as is poſſible for man: and this he can never attain to, without a great deal of labour; which a wiſe man ought to beſtow, not for the ſake of ſpeaking and acting towards men; but to be able to ſpeak what is acceptable to the gods; and to act in all as far as poſſible in an acceptable manner. A wiſe man ought to ſtudy to pleaſe, not his fellow-ſervants, but his good maſters: ſo that if the circuit be long, ſays he, do not wonder; for we muſt go round it. And, in attempting what is handſome, it is handſome to endure whatever one happens to ſuffer. The queſtion being ſtarted, What is acceptable to God, with reference to diſcourſe? *Socrates* takes occaſion to tell this ſtory;

At *Neucrates* in *Ægypt*, there is a certain one of the antient gods there, to whom

there is a bird conſecrated, which they call *Ibis*; the name of the deity himſelf, is *Theuth*; who firſt invented number and computation, geometry and aſtronomy; and likewiſe the talus, and the dice; as alſo letters: at that time, *Thamus* was King of all *Ægypt*, at the great city of the upper country, which the *Greeks* call *Ægyptian Thebes*; and the god they call *Ammon*: *Theuth*, coming to him, ſhowed him his arts; and ſaid they ought to be imparted to the reſt of the *Ægyptians*: *Thamus* enquired of him, what utility each of them had; and is ſaid to have pointed out many things to *Theuth*, with regard to each art, both for and againſt it: when they were conſidering letters; This piece of learning, O King! ſaid *Theuth*, would render the *Ægyptians* more wiſe and of better memories; for it hath been invented as a medicine for memory, and for wiſdom. He replied, It is the part of one to give birth to the things relative to art; and it is the part of another, to judge what harm or utility they bring to thoſe who uſe them: and you now, in being the father of letters, have, thro' your benevolence, ſaid the reverſe of what they are able to perform: for this piece of learning

will

will introduce forgetfulneſs into the ſouls of thoſe who learn it, through the neglect of meditation and recollection; whilſt they truſt to foreign characters, and do not recollect the inward ones of the things themſelves: you have not therefore found out a medicine for memory; and, with regard to wiſdom, you give your diſciples the opinion of it, but not the thing itſelf. For, in reading many things without a maſter, they will appear to know many things, whilſt they are generally ſpeaking without knowledge; and they will be troubleſome in company, having the appearance of wiſdom in place of being wiſe.

The application of this ſtory is, That the man, who piques himſelf on a knowledge of letters, but is a ſtranger to the dialectic art, and the exerciſe of thorough recollection, and is converſant with outward characters, but cannot have recourſe to a fund of ſublime ideas within himſelf; can never become a juſt and animated ſpeaker. Painting, ſaith *Socrates*, ſetteth up her brood as if they were alive; but if you aſk them any queſtion, they are very modeſtly ſilent: the caſe is the ſame as to diſcourſe, without

out intelligence. A diſcourſe of this kind, always needs the aſſiſtance of its father, but can neither defend, nor aſſiſt itſelf: but he, who with intelligence writeth in the ſoul of the learner, is able to aſſiſt himſelf, and underſtandeth both to ſpeak, and to be ſilent, as occaſion requires. Tell me this, ſaith he; the farmer who hath intelligence, if he apply to ſowing, whether will he with diligence in the ſummer ſeaſon, chuſe to ſow in the gardens of *Adonis* that he may ſee the grain become beautiful in eight days time; or will he do this only in way of amuſement? but as for thoſe grains to which he applies himſelf in earneſt, for the ſake of increaſe, he will employ the art of agriculture; and, ſowing them in proper ſoil, be content, if what he ſows, come to perfection in eight months. *Plato* admits, that amuſement, in the garden of letters, appears beautiful; but maintains, that ſerious employment is much more beautiful; and that when one, uſing the dialectical art, and meeting with a ſoul proper for it, plants and ſows in it diſcourſes with intelligence, theſe are able both to give aſſiſtance to themſelves, and to the planter; and that ſome ſpringing

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up hence always in ſucceſſion, after others, amidſt the difference of manners, are able to preſerve the ſame ſeed immortal; and render the man poſſeſſed of it, happy, as far as it is poſſible for man to be. That not to underſtand reality, and appearance, with regard to what is juſt and unjuſt, evil and good, can never in truth avoid being reproachful; not even altho' the whole multitude ſhould commend it: but that the man who utters diſcourſes with a view to inſtruction; and which are in reality writ in his own ſoul, concerning what is juſt, and beautiful, and good, can alone make diſcourſes with energy, perfection, and ſuch as are worthy of attention. Such a man as this, ſays *Socrates*, to *Phædrus*, ſeems to be ſuch an one, as you and I would wiſh to become ourſelves. And do you tell *Lyſias*, that we two going to the fountain-head of the Nymphs and Muſes, heard diſcourſes, which they charged us to tell *Lyſias*, and likewiſe any other who compoſes diſcourſes; and to tell *Homer*, or any other who hath compoſed ſimple poetry, or what is accompanied with ſongs; and thirdly, to tell *Solon*, or whoever elſe, in political diſcourſes, hath wrote inſtitutions, denominating them laws; that a man ought

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not to have his denomination from theſe written diſcourſes which were compoſed only for amuſement; but from theſe things in which he hath employed himſelf ſeriouſly. And being aſked what he himſelf would tell *Iſocrates*, he replies; *Iſocrates* is yet but young; but what I am preſaging concerning him, I am willing to tell you: he ſeems to me, ſaith he, to have a better genius than appears in the diſcourſes of *Lyſias*; and this is blended with a more noble diſpoſition; ſo that it will be no wonder, if he ſhall, in theſe diſcourſes he is now attempting, ſurpaſs all the youth: and if he ſhall not reſt ſatisfied with theſe things, but ſhall be led to what is higher; the ardor in his attempt, will be more divine; for he hath by nature, my friend, a certain philoſophy in his intellect. The concluſion of the whole dialogue, is this prayer of *Socrates*: Propitious *Pan*, and all ye other Deities of this place, vouchſafe to me to become beautiful within; and grant that external things may be friendly to thoſe within me; may I deem the wiſe man wealthy; and may I have ſuch a quantity of gold as no other can bear, or manage, than the temperate man.

FINIS.

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